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ABSTRACT
The rapid adoption of mobile money use in Africa
raises concerns regarding the privacy and security of
users, particularly in light of Financial Action Task Force
recommendations requiring user transparency and the
collection of transaction data. The transparency required
of the now-financially-included—particularly in nations
with weak adherence to the rule of law and limited privacy
protections—leaves users vulnerable to abuse. Further, the
increasing complexity of mobile phone use that is indicative
of mobile money applications raises concerns regarding
Africa’s preparedness for heightened security threats that
come hand in hand with increased use. To address these
problems, the authors of this Article recommend specific
policy actions by African nations to improve consumer
privacy and cybersecurity, supported by policies of
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, mobile telephony has enjoyed
phenomenal adoption rates across most of Africa. Since 2005,
there has been a five-fold increase in the number of African mobile
phone subscriptions resulting in 53.1 mobile phone subscriptions
per 100 inhabitants in 2011. 1 While other areas of the world have
adopted mobile phones to an even greater degree, the relative
impact in Africa, where fixed telephone lines are available to less
than 2 percent of the population, is perhaps greater than anywhere
else. As the primary means of communication for most Africans,
mobile phones have become a source of significant economic
growth and a platform for innovation. One of the most dynamic of
these innovations has been mobile money, the use of mobile
phones to purchase goods or services through funds connected to
the user’s account. With a broad base of mobile phone users
1

Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication Service
Sector, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/
at_glance/keytelecom.html (last visited July 28, 2012).
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already in place, the widespread adoption of mobile money could
have enormous positive impacts across Africa. On a continent with
too few banking options necessary for a dynamic and modern
economy, mobile money has the potential to address long-existing
gaps in African economies. 2 Unfortunately, the rapid growth of
mobile telephony in Africa has not been accompanied by
appropriate consideration for privacy and security concerns,
opening the door for abuse and erosion of the application’s utility.
In light of limited privacy protections and a vulnerable cyber
environment, the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) raise a number of concerns associated with mobile money
in Africa. As a financial service, the FATF Recommendations
apply to mobile money just as with traditional banking services.
The global effort to combat money laundering and terrorism is as
applicable to mobile money services as to traditional banking.
From a general security perspective, the identification, verification,
and reporting requirements of the FATF Recommendations are a
positive effort to ensure that mobile money applications do not
become tools for money laundering. The requirements for user
transparency, however, introduce a potential problem. FATF
Recommendation 10 states that financial institutions must perform
Customer Due Diligence, which includes confirming the identity
of clients and scrutinizing client transactions. 3 Further,
Recommendation 11 requires financial institutions to maintain
records of all transactions for five years, “to enable them to comply
swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities.” 4
These requirements for transparency and record keeping pose a
number of user privacy concerns for mobile money applications in
Africa, particularly in those nations with weak adherence to the
2

Mobile Money in Africa: Press 1 for Modernity, THE ECONOMIST (Apr.
28, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21553510.
3
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING
MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION:
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 14-15 (2012), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendati
ons%20(approved%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May%202012%20web
%20version.pdf.
4
Id. at 15.
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rule of law and limited privacy protections. Further, the increasing
complexity of mobile phone use that is indicative of mobile money
applications raises concerns regarding Africa’s preparedness for
heightened security threats that come hand in hand with increased
use.
I. PRIVACY CONCERNS: TRANSPARENT USE WITHOUT PRIVACY
PROTECTION
According to FATF Recommendations 10 and 11, financial
institutions should not allow customers to conduct business
anonymously; and they must maintain user transaction records for
five years. In most traditional banking settings, this requirement is
both sensible and non-controversial. It does, however, raise
significant questions for African users of mobile money services,
particularly considering the limitations of privacy protections in
Africa. For instance, a recent UN report noted that amongst the
members of the East African Community—Burundi, Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda—there is no legislation “that
clearly defines who can get access to a mobile money trail, and
how, when or under what conditions such access may be
obtained.” 5 Inadequate privacy protections can lead to abuse by
governments and data brokers as well as leave personal
information susceptible to theft or leakage, ultimately damaging
user trust and limiting adoption and use.
A. Limited Privacy Protections
There are a number of reasons to explain the limits of privacy
protection in Africa. First, a strong communitarian strain exists
throughout much of Africa. This mindset deemphasizes the rights
of individuals in favor of those of community. In such a context,
the privacy of individuals is given little consideration. 6 Second,
5

U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., Mobile Money for Business Development
in the East African Community 20 (2012), available at http://unctad.org/
en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2012d2_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD].
6
See Seymour Goodman & Andrew Harris, Emerging Markets: The
Coming African Tsunami of Information Insecurity, COMM. OF THE ACM, Dec.

2013]

PRIVACY AND SECURITY CONCERNS ASSOCIATED
WITH MOBILE MONEY APPLICATIONS IN AFRICA

249

traditional economies with limited electronic communication and
commerce have less need for individual privacy protection as there
are few means to collect, use, and exploit sensitive information.
Until very recently, the vast majority of Africans did not engage in
data compiling transactions. For both of the reasons above, there
are few established legal protections in African nations. Most
nations do not formally recognize a right to personal privacy, and
most do not have laws or regulators in place to monitor abuse. 7
Compounding the lack of legal protections is the relative absence
of public interest groups to monitor government behavior, propose
public policy, and promote awareness. This all leads to situations
where serious abuses can occur with little impediment. Even in
South Africa, where some legal protections are in place, illegal
interception and abuse of electronic communications by
intelligence agencies is routine. 8 While a limited privacy
protection regime may have caused little concern just a short time
ago, the African boom in mobile telephony significantly heightens
the risk to consumers operating in an ecosystem without
protection.
B. Potential for Abuse
In the context of limited privacy protections and because FATF
requires identity verification and data collection, African mobile
money users may find their privacy threatened by governmental
and corporate abuse. In cash-based economies, the spending and
savings activities of individuals are known to an interested third
party only with great effort. This is the environment that most
Africans have come to understand, developing social behaviors
reflective of spending that is anonymous to government and
corporate entities. Despite a lack of privacy protections, the
2010, at 24, available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1859215&dl=
ACM&coll=DL&CFID=111892502&CFTOKEN=79495868.
7
See Hanno N. Olinger et al., Western Privacy and/or Ubuntu? Some
Critical Comments on the Influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill in
South Africa, 39 INT’L INFO. & LIBR. REV. 31 (2007).
8
Heidi Swart, Secret State: How the Government Spies on You, MAIL &
GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2011), http://mg.co.za/article/2011-10-14-secret-state/.
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inherent anonymity of cash prevents any other entity from
knowing the extent of an individual’s transactions. Due to FATF
requirements, however, the service provider can and must record
every detail of a user’s transactions in a mobile money
environment. It is also important to note that the initial wave of
mobile phone adoption was anonymous, as the vast majority of
users purchased and used unregistered pre-paid phones. Many
African nations are now reversing this initial trend by requiring
SIM-card registration, further reducing anonymity and potentially
limiting private use. 9 The availability of transaction data opens the
door for abuse by an unscrupulous government, which could gain
access to transaction records with little effort. 10 This information
could then be used in a number of ways to harass, intimidate, or
manipulate the violated citizen.
Corporate abuse of personal information can have similarly
insidious effects in a mobile money environment without legal
safeguards. Mobile money services necessarily operate in a datarich environment that creates incentives for the commoditization of
personal information and targeted advertising. A fully employed
mobile money ecosystem can include a mobile network operator,
financial institution, trusted service manager, marketer, retailer,
and the customer. Each of these entities (other than the customer)
has a growing interest in collecting personal information tied to
mobile money transactions. With so many interested parties and
little consumer protection, the opportunities for data leakage and
subsequent abuse are abundant. 11 Liberal collecting and sharing
policies result in electronic dossiers useful not only for providing
targeted advertising, but also for making decisions regarding
9

See Chikaodili Juliet Hemeson, Directive on Consumer Data for SIM
Card Registration in the Telecommunications Sector: An African Perspective
(Jan. 8, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1982033.
10
See Louis de Koker & Nicola Jentzsch, Financial Inclusion and Financial
Integrity: Aligned Incentives? (July 2011) (unpublished conference paper, The
Shadow Economy, Tax Evasion and Money Laundering Conference), (on file
with the University of Münster), available at http://dro.deakin.edu.au/
view/DU:30041719.
11
See Andrew Harris et al., Emerging Privacy and Security Concerns for
Digital Wallet Deployment, in PRIVACY IN AMERICA: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 185 (William Aspray & Philip Doty eds., 2011).
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employment or credit worthiness as well as for committing fraud.
It is important to note that the threats of data leakage are
amplified in a mobile money environment because how we spend
is a valuable predictor of who we are and how we will spend or
possibly otherwise behave in the future. Since FATF requires
financial institutions to record user transactions, this information is
necessarily compiled and available for use. The ability to connect
basic personal information to spending records obtained through
mobile phones has great commercial use—and potentially misuse.
In places where mobile money is not yet extensively used, like
North America and Europe, a spending record connected to the
user’s mobile phone is less accessible or not available at all, so
nations in these regions have not yet needed to wrestle fully with
the implications of mobile money data. But in Africa, mobile
money data sets are quickly growing. As Africans also begin to use
their phones to access the Internet, the incentives to commoditize
this data will grow and present challenges yet unseen in Western
nations.
The potential for abuse of private information can harm not
only the violated citizens, but also the overall economy. If
governments and businesses abuse users’ trust, they will restrain
adoption and limit the utility of mobile money, thus limiting the
application’s utility and holding back their countries. Two of the
authors witnessed a good illustration of this at a cybersecurity
conference for East African government officials in Kenya. 12
During a discussion of African broadband adoption, a law
enforcement official from one of the participating countries stood
up to proclaim the virtues of Facebook for monitoring and catching
criminals. Such behavior can have a chilling effect on technology
adoption, and the brazenness of the statement in a room full of
government lawyers and officials demonstrates the lack of regard
for privacy that some in government demonstrate. Calls to monitor
social media are certainly not confined to Africa, but when
proposed in industrialized nations, monitoring is suggested only
within tight restrictions and a devotion to the rule of law. 13 In most
12
13

East African Cyberspace Workshop, Nairobi, Kenya (July 25-27, 2011).
See SIR DAVID OMAND ET AL., # INTELLIGENCE (2012), available at

252

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:3

African nations, there is little to stop governments or corporations
from pushing the boundaries of acceptable use with regards to
revealing mobile money data. If widespread abuse becomes
commonplace, users may walk away from mobile money and all
its enormous benefits.
II. SECURITY
The growth of mobile money is indicative of a larger trend of
greater and more sophisticated mobile telephony use—a trend that
many African nations are ill prepared for, for a host of reasons. As
user experiences grow richer and smart phone adoption
increases—a trend well underway 14—mobile phones will become
a more appealing target to a wide range of cyber threats. The
FATF requirements contribute to this trend by requiring user
identification and transaction recording, meaning that mobile
phones become directly linked to financial accounts and rich data
sets, increasing the desirability for hackers. Smart phones are just
as susceptible—if not more so—to the same viruses, worms, and
botnets that plague PCs. 15 In this environment, the user might lose
more than just personal information, but notably money, and be
susceptible to other forms of crime through exposure via his
mobile device. The FATF requirements are generally beneficial for
security issues considering their focus on the serious threats
associated with terrorism, money laundering, and weapons
proliferation. Further, FATF may generate constructive pressure by
forcing regulators to more deeply consider the range of risks
associated with mobile money. The extent of African cybersecurity
deficiencies is significant enough, however, that FATF
requirements alone—which do not address cybersecurity—are
unlikely to compel improvements. Without proper attention to
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/_Intelligence_-_web.pdf?1335197327.
14
Samsung Sees Smartphones Leading African Growth, REUTERS (Mar. 22,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/22/us-samsung-africa-id
USBRE82L0RU20120322.
15
GA. TECH INFO. SEC. CTR., EMERGING CYBER THREATS REPORT FOR 2009
5 (2008), available at http://www.gtisc.gatech.edu/pdf/CyberThreatsReport
2009.
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security on the devices that enable mobile money, the user may be
vulnerable to criminal activity.
A. Cybersecurity Limitations
This vulnerability is particularly pronounced in the African
context due to a set of unique challenges that amplify the growing
insecurity threat. First, most African nations have inadequate laws
and institutions to confront serious cyber threats. 16 While various
efforts are underway to encourage the adoption of national legal
frameworks, even these steps have limited effects without
institutions in place to monitor networks and remediate threats.
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) have become
valuable assets for performing these necessary functions, but they
are either lacking or in nascent stages across much of Africa.
Beyond the institutional and legal inadequacy, African nations
suffer from a shortage of trained public-sector professionals
needed in both the policy and operational spaces. This is a
common problem for all nations, but one that is exacerbated in
Africa where the number of individuals with advanced information
security knowledge is relatively lower than elsewhere. Those with
such knowledge tend to be drawn to the higher paying private
sector, leaving little expertise for governments. Without capable
CERTs in place with the commensurate technical expertise to
operate them, African networks are more vulnerable to cyber
threats, leaving mobile money users vulnerable to attack and fraud.
Awareness is another crucial piece of the security equation.
The rapid adoption of mobile phones and applications like mobile
money has placed these useful tools in the hands of users with little
prior experience with technology. Users with limited digital
literacy are more likely to be unaware of cyber threats, placing

16

Eric Agwe-Mbarika Akuta et al., Combating Cyber Crime in Sub-Sahara
Africa; A Discourse on Law, Policy and Practice, 1 J. PEACE, GENDER & DEV.
STUDIES 129, 131 (2011), available at http://interesjournals.org/JPGDS/pdf/
2011/May/Akuta%20et%20al.pdf.
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themselves and the networks at greater risk. 17 Lack of cyber
awareness is certainly a leading cause of infection across the globe,
but African nations have a higher proportion of low-capacity users,
and thus more users unfamiliar with the best practices that can
limit vulnerability. 18 Awareness issues extend beyond the average
user into the corporate setting as well. Because most African
companies have evolved in an environment of limited
interconnectivity, they have had little reason to focus on
cybersecurity measures and best practices. But now that broadband
connectivity is growing, it is essential that measures such as
software standardization and network monitoring be implemented.
With lax operating procedures in place, corporate behavior can
open threat vectors, infecting networks and endangering users. It is
important to remember that a user of a mobile money application
connected to an infected network is far more vulnerable than a user
engaging in basic web browsing and email. It is therefore essential
that heavy network users such as corporations are actively
protecting the network.
Because the Internet knows few political boundaries,
international cooperation on cybersecurity issues is a necessity, but
few African nations are engaged in cross border law enforcement
efforts. Only South Africa and Senegal have joined the Council of
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, the most significant
international law enforcement effort to address cybercrime. 19
Further, there are limitations to the assistance developed nations
are able and willing to provide. First, it is uncommon for
developed nations to devote significant resources to cyber
assistance. Most assistance funds are directed at more traditional
development projects such as health or education. Second, details
17

See Steven Furnell et al., Security Beliefs and Barriers for Novice Internet
Users, 27 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 235 (2008).
18
Marthie Grobler & Joey Jansen van Vuuren, Broadband Broadens Scope
for Cyber Crime in Africa (Aug. 2010) (unpublished conference paper, Info.
Security for S. Afr. Conf.), available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/
articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5588287&contentType=Conference+Publicati
ons&sortType%3Dasc_p_Sequence%26filter%3DAND%28p_IS_Number%3A
5588257%29.
19
See the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG.
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of cybersecurity efforts and methodologies are often considered
classified or restricted information in western nations. These
nations are reluctant or completely unable to cooperate with
nations they regard as having lax information security standards.
All too often this is the case in the African context, making
western governments unlikely to meaningfully share information
and cooperate with African states.
Finally, the state of cybersecurity in Africa is hindered by the
low prioritization from national leaders. This is of course
understandable in the African context where limited resources
must first be allocated to address society’s most fundamental
problems. The low priority for cybersecurity in the face of other
pressing issues means that solutions requiring strong governmental
direction are absent from most African states, further endangering
vulnerable networks and their applications. For this reason, and for
the reasons described above, the African continent is likely the
least safe place to operate a sensitive application like mobile
money. Further, as mobile money grows more popular, it will
inevitably become a greater target for criminal activity. If Africa’s
cybersecurity deficiencies are not addressed in a timely manner,
the widespread adoption of mobile money may be accompanied by
widespread mobile money abuse.
B. Examples of Specific Mobile Money Threats
Without proper attention to basic security features, mobile
money users introduce themselves to numerous threats, the most
damaging being the loss of money should an assailant gain
physical control of the mobile device. Given that nearly 5 percent
of smartphones issued to or used by employees are lost annually20
and that only 30 percent of users protect their devices with
passwords and data encryption, 21 the possibility of someone other
20

PONEMON INST., THE LOST SMARTPHONE PROBLEM: BENCHMARK STUDY
U.S. ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2011), available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/
resources/reports/rp-ponemon-lost-smartphone-problem.pdf.
21
Carole Theriault, Survey Says 70% Don't Password-Protect Mobiles:
Download Free Mobile Toolkit, NAKED SEC. (Aug. 9, 2011),
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/08/09/free-sophos-mobile-securityOF
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than a device’s owner using it to gain access to mobile money is
significant. It should also be noted that such mechanisms only
offer protection against unsophisticated attackers. In particular,
prior work has demonstrated that a technically adept adversary
may be able to take advantage of poor security design within
mobile money apps 22 or simply bypass poorly implemented
encryption. 23 Accordingly, it is critical that both users and
financial institutions consider a range of risk models.
More subtle digital attacks against users are also possible. For
instance, mobile money applications could also be used to isolate
or burden a potential target. Malicious applications within the
phones themselves could easily target unsuspecting users. For
instance, a “trojaned” application could simply fail to allow
transactions from a target’s phone to clear, dramatically limiting
the target’s ability to make purchases or move funds. Alternatively,
the application could illegally track all the purchases made by the
target, potentially giving the adversary information about the
target’s strategies and physical location. Finally, such an
application could make arbitrary purchases on behalf of the target.
Given that the avenues to contest the legitimacy of such purchases
are generally lacking (e.g., the presence of the correct PIN made
with a purchase virtually ensures that liability is held by the target
and not their financial institution), such an application could
slowly drain funds from the target’s account. Performed in an
inconspicuous fashion, such purchases would be unlikely to raise
alarms in traditional fraud detection systems. With an increasingly
appealing target for criminals and an environment of cyber
insecurity, African mobile money uses face an uncertain future.

toolkit/.
22
See William Enck et al., A Study of Android Application Security (Aug.
2011)
(unpublished
conference
paper,
USENIX),
available
at
http://static.usenix.org/events/sec11/tech/full_papers/Enck.pdf.
23
Ina Fried, At Defcon, Hackers Show How to Hack Your Android Phone
Encryption, ALL THINGS D (July 28, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://allthingsd.com/
20120728/at-defcon-hackers-show-how-to-bypass-android-encryption/.

2013]

PRIVACY AND SECURITY CONCERNS ASSOCIATED
WITH MOBILE MONEY APPLICATIONS IN AFRICA

257

III. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Mobile money has enormous potential for the people and
economies of Africa, yet users must ultimately trust the technology
if its greatest impact is to be realized. Lurking issues associated
with personal privacy and cybersecurity currently threaten that user
trust. Both are global problems requiring global solutions with
cooperation from all stakeholders.
A. African Solutions
First and foremost, African nations must recognize the
importance of digital technologies to the future of their economies.
While perhaps one of the most dynamic and compelling, mobile
money is just one of many technologies with the power to help
transform African economies. With financial resources
understandably limited, national leaders should take policy actions
that will increase user trust without requiring exceptional monetary
and other resource allocations.
Primary amongst these steps is instituting comprehensive but
flexible privacy regimes. In reviewing the lack of privacy
regulation in East Africa, the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) declares that “simple and
transparent mechanisms are needed through which users can
authorize an entity to access” data associated with mobile money. 24
Individuals should be empowered through national legislation to
control their personal information and corporations should be
required to use that information only in contextually appropriate
ways. Licensing for mobile money services should include explicit
rules for the collection and sharing of personal information.
Crucially, it is imperative that lawmakers implement
comprehensive regulations rather than taking a sectoral approach,
as has unfolded in the United States. Sector-specific laws may
prove inadequate for converged technologies like mobile money,
leaving banks, telecommunications companies, and data brokers
24

UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 20.
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with differing requirements leading to inconsistent treatment of
user data. 25
There have been some recent positive steps regarding privacy
legislation in Africa. In February 2012, Ghana passed a
comprehensive data protection bill establishing users’ rights of
data access, control, and consent of use. 26 The bill also creates a
Data Protection Commission to enforce and regulate the new
law. 27 Further, a draft bill in Kenya specific to electronic retail
requires user consent for any information sharing. 28 Both are
positive steps and serve as recognition from these two nations of
the necessity to protect users and promote trust in order to
maximize utility of new technologies like mobile money. Further
these efforts may serve to encourage other African nations to
explore privacy legislation. While protecting citizens should be a
primary concern for policymakers, they must also seek balance in
any law, working to ensure that new legislation is not overly
prescriptive or burdensome for corporations bringing innovative
tools to the marketplace. For instance, while many international
businesses welcome the European’s new privacy plans to
streamline privacy rules in a more centralized manner, these same
companies also protest the regulation’s more stringent guidelines
such as the proposal for an individual’s “right to be forgotten.”29
While the proper balance between adequate protection and flexible
business operations is certainly delicate, African leaders must act
in order to ensure the ultimate success of mobile money.
To address the lack of technical capacity, policy makers should
stress the study of security, privacy, computer science and
information programs in universities. There is a growing demand
for African app developers, and universities will train many of
25

See Harris et al., supra note 11.
Daily Guide, Data Protection Bill Passed, GHANAWEB (Feb. 10, 2012),
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=229
717.
27
Data Protection Act 843 of 2010 (Ghana), available at
http://www.parliament.gh/assets/file/Bills/Data%20Protection%20Act,%202010
.pdf.
28
UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 20.
29
Privacy Laws: Private Data, Public Rules, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28,
2012), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21543489.
26
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them. These universities should insist on strong privacy and
security backgrounds. These courses of study should be promoted
as holding particular import for future development with incentives
created to draw in prospective students. To help facilitate a greater
emphasis on privacy and security at the university level, policy
makers should encourage empowering partnerships with
international institutions that excel in the field. For instance, the
Rwandan government recently sponsored a Carnegie Mellon
University campus in Kigali with the government committing to
offer substantial scholarships to qualifying applicants. Carnegie
Mellon’s Rwanda campus offers Masters of Science in Information
Technology with the option to focus on cybersecurity and began
classes in the fall of 2012. 30 This action by the Rwandan
government demonstrates a clear understanding from national
leaders that technological advances must be accompanied with
sufficient human capacity. Similar partnerships coupled with the
promotion of security and privacy studies can help African nations
make strides in addressing human capacity issues.
African application developers and service providers can of
course begin to place a greater emphasis on personal privacy and
security by designing solutions to protect networks and data and
providing users tools to protect themselves and their devices. In
considering the problems of transparency in mobile money
applications in the African context, developers could explore some
of the benefits of e-cash, a primarily conceptual digital currency in
which transactions are anonymous and funds cannot be double
spent. Bitcoin is the most prominent manifestation of e-cash,
although numerous technical and regulatory problems exist with
this particular implementation. 31 With proper research, mobile
money applications may find some of the principles and features of
e-cash useful in introducing layers of anonymity and protection for
users. Finally, African nations should commission public
awareness campaigns focused on cybersecurity and personal data.
With relatively little money, public awareness campaigns can
30

See Carnegie Mellon University in Rwanda, http://www.cmu.edu/
rwanda/.
31
See Bitcoin Project, http://bitcoin.org/.
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increase digital literacy, informing consumers of basic dos and do
nots to protect themselves and others.
B. United States Policy
Developed nations should pursue policy solutions as well. The
safe and effective employment of mobile money across Africa is
clearly in the interest of countries like the United States. Indeed,
the United States has a number of applicable polices in place.
Joining these policies with specific action to assist African nations
can serve to address some of the potential problems. One of the
most vocal proponents for a free and open Internet has been
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “The United States will
continue to promote an Internet where people’s rights are protected
and that it is open to innovation, interoperable all over the world,
secure enough to hold people’s trust, and reliable enough to
support their work.” 32 These words have provided leadership for
the United States to increase diplomatic pressure on offending
governments and raise the costs of bad behavior. Because of her
initiative, American embassies are poised to monitor for and
respond to governmental abuse of digital technologies like mobile
money.
The forward leaning posture of Secretary Clinton should be
matched with a clear policy on dual-use technology controls. The
U.S. government needs to put careful thought into the export of
technologies that can be used to block, monitor, or filter digital
content as well as performing more benign and easily marketable
tasks. Rebecca MacKinnon points out this fact and criticizes the
U.S. government’s complicity: “American corporations are major
suppliers of software and hardware used by all sorts of
governments to carry out censorship and surveillance—and not just
dictatorships.” 33 Therefore, a policy is needed to sufficiently deter
32

Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at George Washington
University, Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices & Challenges in a Networked
World (Feb. 15, 2011), available at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/
156619.htm.
33
Rebecca MacKinnon, Internet Freedom Starts at Home, FOREIGN POLICY
(Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/03/The_Worlds_
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repressive regimes from obtaining these tools and encouraging
democratic governments not to abuse the capabilities of dual use
technologies. While the United States has taken direct action in
some of the most extreme cases, such as President Obama’s
Executive Order banning the transfer of certain technologies to
Iran and Syria, 34 uniform guidance and consistent enforcement
would offer more effective protection.
The United States can and should also make efforts to assist
African nations protecting individual privacy. The recently
released White House Blueprint on Consumer Privacy protection
identifies the needs for both consumer control of personal
information and for the free flow of international data: “The United
States is committed to engaging with its international partners to
increase interoperability in privacy laws by pursuing mutual
recognition, the development of codes of conduct through multistakeholder processes, and enforcement cooperation.” 35 If pursued
with African partners, this policy can help ensure that African
consumers are protected and African economies are equipped to
engage in the global digital marketplace.
Finally, the United States—and indeed other developed
nations—must begin to prioritize cybersecurity cooperation with
Africa. Appropriate high-level U.S. policies are in place, 36 but
significant implementation of those policies is yet to occur. The
President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace commits the
United States to working with developing countries to build
cybersecurity capacity, develop and share best practices, offer
cybercrime training, and to develop and deepen governmental ties
No_1_Threat_to_Internet_Freedom.
34
Exec. Order No. 13,606, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,571 (Apr. 22, 2012), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-04-24/pdf/2012-10034.pdf.
35
THE OBAMA ADMIN., THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A
NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 31 (2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
36
See THE OBAMA ADMIN., THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED
WORLD (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf.
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with counterparts and subject matter experts. To adequately
achieve these commitments, Congress must first acknowledge and
address the global nature of cyber insecurity in Africa. Then,
significant additional resources are needed to allow U.S. experts to
provide technical assistance to partner nations. Finally, there is a
need to reconcile conflicts between the value of information
sharing and the necessity of ensuring the integrity of classified
material. American action alone cannot address the potential
problems facing Africa, but the United States has adopted
promising policies in the last few years that can serve to guide both
American and global action in providing needed assistance.
C. Public Advocacy and Corporate Responsibility
As new technologies proliferate, particularly in African settings
with large populations of users less accustomed to these
technologies, it is essential that public advocacy groups focus their
attention on possible governmental or corporate abuse. Under the
banner of Internet Freedom, human rights groups can monitor for
abuse and apply international pressure to those most egregious
abusers. Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Net” report is an
excellent example of such an effort. 37 By reporting broadly on the
state of government Internet restrictions, Freedom House is
providing an essential tool in helping to hold governments
accountable. As African users adopt sophisticated and specific
applications like mobile money, similar monitoring of
governmental interference in these spaces should be established as
well.
Corporate responsibility is another vital piece in ensuring user
safety and privacy. Service providers and banks have a
responsibility to protect users’ data and finances through technical
means as well through appropriate behavior and policies that do
not expose users to abuse at the hands of repressive governments
or unscrupulous third parties. Beyond a moral issue, widespread
37

See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2011: A GLOBAL
ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET AND DIGITAL MEDIA (Sanja Kelly & Sarah Cook
eds., 2011), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
FOTN2011.pdf.
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adoption of mobile money requires user trust. The necessity of
trust should provide sufficient incentive for responsible corporate
behavior. A positive example of companies proactively committing
to responsible behavior is the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a
multi-stakeholder group that includes Google, Microsoft, and
Yahoo!. 38 GNI attempts to assist technology companies in
protecting privacy and free expression in the face of repressive
regimes and can serve as a model for self-organized corporate
commitment making. Where corporations are complicit in abuse,
other institutions or legal mechanisms, as mentioned above, are
appropriate.
CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt about the enormous potential for mobile
money in Africa. For a continent plagued by limited banking
options, mobile money has in just a short time brought millions to
the ranks of financial inclusion. As part of the global effort to
counter money laundering and terrorism, FATF requirements
demand transparency of all financial services customers, including
mobile money. The increased data collection associated with this
transparency renders mobile money users in Africa particularly
vulnerable to governmental or corporate abuse of the data
generated by mobile transactions. Equally troubling are
cybersecurity concerns, leaving African mobile money users in a
doubly precarious position. Should mobile money platforms come
to be inundated with privacy breaches and malware, users will lose
trust in the application, reversing adoption trends and eliminating
potential gains. It is therefore incumbent for all to act—
government, human rights watchdogs, corporations, and individual
citizens—to address existing deficiencies and ensure that the
power of mobile money will be enjoyed across Africa.
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